The book doesn't have anything to say about the early Paraguayan example, despite recognizing it as the exception to trade-led state development
Not addressing the clear counterexample (certainly emphasized in depency theory arguments) is already problematic enough, but it also weakens the regional analysis, as the author claims about Uruguay that "after 1850 it was not annexed because it lost its geoeconomic value.", omitting that South America's deadliest war was promted by Brazil's 1864 invasion of Uruguay.
It's been a while since I read on the subject, but my memory is that early Paraguay was a (pound for pound) export powerhouse. Was their development not built on large exports of goods like yerba mate?
Quickly looking at wikipedia for reference, it includes this quote:
"During the rule of Carlos Antonio López (1844–1862), the yerba mate business was managed by the military commanders of the district, who could harvest yerba mate as a state enterprise or give concessions."
Which if true, seems like a classic example of trade-led state development no?
During the Francia years Paraguay was largely shut off from the world (besides scant border trade), and that's the time where the pre-war Paraguayan state and social regime takes shape (and indeed, the absence of a large mercantile class was essential for government to impose itself as it did). That's what sets it apart from the rest of Latin America, where a monopoly on force develops later on, at the behest of a increasingly powerful bourgeois.
Let's keep in mind that in the Paraguayan War the state mobilizes basically the entire adult male population, which was quite simply unthinkable for any of the other countries involved.
Incidentaly, the relative unimportance of trade is highlighted by Paraguay's capacity to carry out a prolongued total war under a full blockade.
Sadly, there aren't a lot of rigurous writings about Paraguayan society pre-war (the requisite primary sources probably just aren't there). Mario Maestri's "Paraguai: A República Camponesa (1810 - 1865)" in Portuguese, focuses on that but with a clear positive slant.
"Spain was the major example of a war-making state that taxed too much, especially in its colonies, whereas the less belligerent British Empire benefited from what Adam Smith described as “peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice.”"
I think this is incorrect. See: The Paradox of Power: Understanding Fiscal Capacity in Imperial China and Absolutist Regimes, Ma and Rubin, 2017 (Table 1):
(1) The Ma and Rubin stats treat England and Spain as nation states, when they were in fact empires. Spain taxed its colonies heavily due to direct taxes on indigenous communities and mining. A lot of its spending was also done there. Taxation on the British American colonies, on the other hand, was famously light, but a lot of American colonial goods were taxed in Britain, contributing to the English central government’s high levels of revenue. Looking at English and Spain as discrete nation states therefore gives a misleading impression of what was going on with their taxation.
(2) The English weren’t blowing their tax revenues on stupid land wars in Europe to the same degree as the Spanish. They focused much more on trade, which made them wealthier than the Spanish, facilitating higher levels of taxation. That’s what I mean by trade-led state formation in Europe. So, yes, that is what is wrong with Tilly: it wasn’t war but trade that allowed states to tax more, and those taxes were “easier” despite being higher because those trading nations were wealthier…
That’s more my addition, although it is implicit in Mazzuca. His take is that export-led growth just needed the government to buy off local oligarchs, which is correct. I added that it also tended to empower landowners. That said, in the Argentine case, it was an uneasy alliance between local oligarchs in the provinces and the Pampean landowners.
It was more about agricultural land than minerals.
The book doesn't have anything to say about the early Paraguayan example, despite recognizing it as the exception to trade-led state development
Not addressing the clear counterexample (certainly emphasized in depency theory arguments) is already problematic enough, but it also weakens the regional analysis, as the author claims about Uruguay that "after 1850 it was not annexed because it lost its geoeconomic value.", omitting that South America's deadliest war was promted by Brazil's 1864 invasion of Uruguay.
It's been a while since I read on the subject, but my memory is that early Paraguay was a (pound for pound) export powerhouse. Was their development not built on large exports of goods like yerba mate?
Quickly looking at wikipedia for reference, it includes this quote:
"During the rule of Carlos Antonio López (1844–1862), the yerba mate business was managed by the military commanders of the district, who could harvest yerba mate as a state enterprise or give concessions."
Which if true, seems like a classic example of trade-led state development no?
During the Francia years Paraguay was largely shut off from the world (besides scant border trade), and that's the time where the pre-war Paraguayan state and social regime takes shape (and indeed, the absence of a large mercantile class was essential for government to impose itself as it did). That's what sets it apart from the rest of Latin America, where a monopoly on force develops later on, at the behest of a increasingly powerful bourgeois.
Let's keep in mind that in the Paraguayan War the state mobilizes basically the entire adult male population, which was quite simply unthinkable for any of the other countries involved.
Incidentaly, the relative unimportance of trade is highlighted by Paraguay's capacity to carry out a prolongued total war under a full blockade.
Sadly, there aren't a lot of rigurous writings about Paraguayan society pre-war (the requisite primary sources probably just aren't there). Mario Maestri's "Paraguai: A República Camponesa (1810 - 1865)" in Portuguese, focuses on that but with a clear positive slant.
"Spain was the major example of a war-making state that taxed too much, especially in its colonies, whereas the less belligerent British Empire benefited from what Adam Smith described as “peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice.”"
I think this is incorrect. See: The Paradox of Power: Understanding Fiscal Capacity in Imperial China and Absolutist Regimes, Ma and Rubin, 2017 (Table 1):
https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/75218/1/WP261.pdf
Britain did tax more than Spain, specially from 1700 onward. Maybe another reason we should discount Tilly?
I’ll try to explain:
(1) The Ma and Rubin stats treat England and Spain as nation states, when they were in fact empires. Spain taxed its colonies heavily due to direct taxes on indigenous communities and mining. A lot of its spending was also done there. Taxation on the British American colonies, on the other hand, was famously light, but a lot of American colonial goods were taxed in Britain, contributing to the English central government’s high levels of revenue. Looking at English and Spain as discrete nation states therefore gives a misleading impression of what was going on with their taxation.
(2) The English weren’t blowing their tax revenues on stupid land wars in Europe to the same degree as the Spanish. They focused much more on trade, which made them wealthier than the Spanish, facilitating higher levels of taxation. That’s what I mean by trade-led state formation in Europe. So, yes, that is what is wrong with Tilly: it wasn’t war but trade that allowed states to tax more, and those taxes were “easier” despite being higher because those trading nations were wealthier…
Does that make sense?
Does Mazzuca address mineral endowments or is this your addition?
That’s more my addition, although it is implicit in Mazzuca. His take is that export-led growth just needed the government to buy off local oligarchs, which is correct. I added that it also tended to empower landowners. That said, in the Argentine case, it was an uneasy alliance between local oligarchs in the provinces and the Pampean landowners.
It was more about agricultural land than minerals.
That's very notable: the importance of agricultural over "industrial" growth. In part because of the lack of iron and coal—no?